Optimal Incentives in Dynamic Multiple Project Contracts
Year of publication: |
2007-05
|
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Authors: | Miquel-Florensa, Josepa |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, York University |
Subject: | Dynamic Contracts | Multitask | Foreign Aid |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | 58 pages |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; F35 - Foreign Aid |
Source: |
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Financing Multi-stage projects under moral hazard and limited commitment
Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, (2007)
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Debt Relief and Incentive-Compatible Conditionality
Scholl, Almuth, (2010)
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Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality
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Aid Effectiveness: A comparison of Tied and Untied Aid
Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, (2007)
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Financing Multi-stage projects under moral hazard and limited commitment
Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, (2007)
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Essays on foreign aid contracts/
Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, (2006)
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