Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information.

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontier emissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter's concern for the environment.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Kerschbamer, R. ; Maderner, N.
Institutions:	Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis
Subject:	POLLUTION \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	D62 - Externalities ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; Q25 - Water ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646679