Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach
Year of publication: |
May 2018
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Authors: | Kolotilin, Anton |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 13.2018, 2, p. 607-635
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | information design | information disclosure | informed receiver | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Signalling | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1805 [DOI] hdl:10419/197158 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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