Optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Eső, Péter ; Szentes, Balàzs |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 74.2007, 3, p. 705-731
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Signalling | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Theorie | Theory |
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