Optimal insurance deductibles under limited information
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fey, Jan-Christian ; Schmeiser, Hato ; Schreiber, Florian |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1879-1751, ZDB-ID 1460618-5. - Vol. 220.2024, p. 202-221
|
Subject: | Limited information | Optimal deductible choice | Policyholder decision rules | Welfare economics | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Selbstbeteiligung | Deductible | Entscheidung | Decision | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory |
-
Information design in insurance markets : selling peaches in a market for lemons
García, Daniel, (2018)
-
Mourdoukoutas, Fotios, (2024)
-
A reconsideration of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market model by information theory
Mamada, Robert, (2021)
- More ...
-
Beer, Simone, (2017)
-
Investment guarantees in financial products : an analysis of consumer preferences
Luca, Daliana, (2023)
-
Essays on the regulation of insurance firms and consumer preferences for term life insurance
Schreiber, Florian, (2015)
- More ...