OPTIMAL LABOR CONTRACTS WITH NON-CONTRACTIBLE HUMAN CAPITAL.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | KANEMOTO, Y. ; MACLEOD, B. |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | human resources | workers | moral hazard | contracts | enterprises | wages |
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