Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Garoupa, Nuno |
Published in: |
Conflict and governance. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-00220-0. - 2003, p. 123-134
|
Subject: | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Kriminalitätsökonomik | Economics of crime | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law |
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