Optimal long-term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information
Year of publication: |
September-October 2017
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Authors: | Lobel, Ilan ; Xiao, Wenqiang |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0030-364X, ZDB-ID 123389-0. - Vol. 65.2017, 5, p. 1275-1284
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Subject: | dynamic contracting | dynamic mechanism design | inventory control | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Lagerhaltungsmodell | Inventory model | Lieferkette | Supply chain | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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