Optimal non-prosecution agreements and the reputational effects of convictions
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mungan, Murat C. |
Published in: |
International review of law and economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188, ZDB-ID 704902-X. - Vol. 59.2019, p. 57-64
|
Subject: | Deferred prosecution agreements | Deterrence | Non-prosecution agreements | Over-deterrence | Reputational sanctions | Reputation | Theorie | Theory | Strafe | Punishment | Sanktion | Sanction |
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