Optimal observability in a linear income tax
Year of publication: |
2010-01
|
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Authors: | Slemrod, Joel ; Traxler, Christian |
Institutions: | Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft |
Subject: | optimal linear income taxation | observability | tax enforcement |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 2010_04 |
Classification: | D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation |
Source: |
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Optimal observability in a linear income tax
Slemrod, Joel, (2010)
-
Optimal observability in a linear income tax
Slemrod, Joel, (2010)
-
Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax
Slemrod, Joel B., (2010)
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Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information
Fellner, Gerlinde, (2009)
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Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance
Traxler, Christian, (2009)
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Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement
Traxler, Christian, (2009)
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