Optimal Opt-in "Climate" Contracts
The paper studies the design of a treadable permit system with opt-in possibilities for LDCs countries in the context of climate change. In setting the optimal opt-in rule, the regulator faces a trade-off between production efficiency (minimization of control costs) and information rent extraction (reduction of excess permits). Results from simulation exercises based on data from MIT´s EPPA Model are also provided.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Montero, Juan Pablo |
Published in: |
Journal of Applied Economics. - Universidad del CEMA, ISSN 1667-6726. - Vol. I.1998, November, 2, p. 363-384
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Publisher: |
Universidad del CEMA |
Saved in:
freely available
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