Optimal Organization

A contract-based model of the endogenous determination of an organization's architecture is considered where a principal has the choice between a two- and a three-level organization. Each organizational architecture is plagued with its own specific form(s) of opportunism. We derive the conditions under which opportunism in a three-level hierarchy becomes so severe as to make this architecture strictly outperformed by a two-level organization.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Vafaï, Kouroche
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 1, p. 518-527
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; D2 - Production and Organizations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278777