Optimal Penalty and Accounting Policy

This paper treats risky investment projects under adverse selection and considers optimal penalties for erroneous auditing reports that maximize social welfare. These penalties give firms an incentive to choose accounting policies that maximize social welfare. We characterize the optimal penalties so that efficient firms choose aggressive accounting policies and inefficient firms choose conservative accounting policies

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Akita, Masatomo ; Osaki, Yusuke
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Strafe \| Punishment

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 9, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2535694 [DOI]
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; M4 - Accounting and Auditing
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036634