Optimal policy intervention, constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information

We study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation. When policy makers’ ability to obfuscate information is constrained, increasing public information precision can be welfare improving.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Colombo, Luca ; Femminis, Gianluca
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 2, p. 224-226
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Public information \| Optimal policy \| Obfuscation \| Welfare

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; E10 - General Aggregative Models. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906357