Optimal Prevention when Informal Penalties Matter: The Case of Medical Errors
Individuals often respond with strong emotions to being penalised. Such responses suggest that informal penalties are important and play a role in creating deterrence. In this paper informal penalties are analysed in the context of medical errors. The introduction of informal penalties, if dependent upon formal ones, implies that: (i) the optimal enforcement regime becomes more lenient, and in some cases the lack of formal punishment is preferred, (ii) the first-best solution becomes unattainable, (iii) liability rates and formal penalty level are no longer perfect deterrence substitutes. In addition, powers of informal penalties provide a rationale for administrative sanctions (informal criticism, reprimands and warnings).
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sverre, Grepperud |
Published in: |
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1682. - Vol. 7.2007, 1, p. 1-30
|
Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by subject
-
Find similar items by using search terms and synonyms from our Thesaurus for Economics (STW).