Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes : a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
Year of publication: |
1991 ; Rev
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dutta, Prajit K. ; Radner, Roy |
Publisher: |
New York, NY |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
Extent: | 29 S |
---|---|
Series: | Discussion paper series / Department of Economics, Columbia University. - New York, NY, ZDB-ID 2278158-4. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Optimal marginal deterrence and incentives for precaution
Thomas, Lionel, (2015)
-
Incentives, status and thereafter : a critical survey
Dey, Oindrila, (2022)
-
Collateral chains and incentives
Kahn, Charles M., (2016)
- More ...
-
Profit maximization and the market selection hypothesis
Dutta, Prajit K., (1994)
-
Dutta, Prajit K., (1993)
-
Dutta, Prajit K., (1991)
- More ...