Optimal procurement mechanisms : bidding on price and damages for breach
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Chillemi, Ottorino ; Mezzetti, Claudio |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 55.2014, 2, p. 335-355
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Subject: | Procurement | Principal-agent | Contract breach | Liquidated damages | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschaffung | Haftung | Liability | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract |
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