Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gravel, Nicholas ; Poitevin, Michel |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 117.2019, p. 451-460
|
Subject: | Asymmetric information | Costly exclusion | Mechanism design | Public goods | Öffentliche Güter | Asymmetrische Information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie |
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