Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Krähmer, Daniel ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 82.2015, 2, p. 762-790
|
Subject: | Sequential screening | Dynamic mechanism design | Participation constraints | Mirrlees approach | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
-
Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
Krähmer, Daniel, (2014)
-
Dynamic screening with limited commitment
Deb, Rahul, (2015)
-
Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality based approach
Arie, Guy, (2011)
- More ...
-
The Benefits of Sequential Screening
Krähmer, Daniel, (2011)
-
Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
Krähmer, Daniel, (2010)
-
Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening
Krähmer, Daniel, (2013)
- More ...