Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian Arye ; Kaplow, Louis |
Published in: |
The Journal of Legal Studies. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 21.1992, 2, p. 365-70
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Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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