Optimal Scrutiny in Multi-Period Promotion Tournaments
Year of publication: |
2000-04
|
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Authors: | Dubey, Pradeep ; Haimanko, Ori |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Multi-period promotion tournaments | extensive form games | subgame perfect equilibria | undominated sample sizes |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2003), 42(1): 1-24 The price is None Number 1254 26 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets |
Source: |
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