Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Fujimoto, Junichi ; Lee, Junsang |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 91.2020, p. 60-79
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Subject: | Dynamic contract | Limited commitment | Microfinance | Social welfare | Mikrofinanzierung | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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