Optimal sequential delegation
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Krähmer, Daniel ; Kovác, Eugen |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 163.2016, p. 849-888
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Subject: | Optimal delegation | Sequential screening | Dynamic mechanism design | Non-transferable utility | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie | Economic dynamics | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Signalling |
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