Optimal Sharing of Foodborne Illness Prevention between Consumers and Industry: The Effect of Regulation and Liability
Consumers and the food industry can both prevent foodborne illness. Two questions are explored: what is the socially optimal level of preventative effort by each and can tort and regulatory instruments induce such behavior? Analysis is complicated by two aspects of food safety technology: one party's effort can affect the marginal effectiveness of the other party's effort and damage functions can be nonconvex. Previous analysis of accidents under torts and regulation fails to consider these generalizations. Indeed, results concerning the ability of tort and regulatory instruments to induce first-best and second-best behavior often contradict previous results in the literature. Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Roe, Brian |
Published in: |
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. - American Agricultural Economics Association. - Vol. 86.2004, 2, p. 359-374
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Publisher: |
American Agricultural Economics Association |
Saved in:
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