Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Menard, Sebastien |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-217X, ZDB-ID 1463157-X. - Vol. 57.2021, 1, p. 5-33
|
Subject: | Lohnfortzahlung | Sick pay | Betrug | Fraud | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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