Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
Sebastien Menard
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Menard, Sebastien |
| Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-217X, ZDB-ID 1463157-X. - Vol. 57.2021, 1, p. 5-33
|
| Subject: | Lohnfortzahlung | Sick pay | Betrug | Fraud | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00355-020-01307-6 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616169