Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Lingenbrink, David ; Iyer, Krishnamurthy |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0030-364X, ZDB-ID 123389-0. - Vol. 67.2019, 5, p. 1397-1416
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Subject: | games: Bayesian persuasion | queues: strategic customers | programming: infinite linear program | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Warteschlangentheorie | Queueing theory | Signalling |
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