Optimal social insurance, incentives, and transition

We study transition in a model in which the process of moving workers from matches in the state sector to new matches in the private sector takes time and involves uncertainty. When there are incentive problems in this rematching process, the optimal scheme may involve forced layoffs, involuntary unemployment, and a recession.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Atkeson, Andrew ; Kehoe, Patrick J.
Institutions:	Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Subject:	Employment (Economic theory)

freely available

Full text |

More access options

www.minneapolisfed.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 546
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005427721