Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance

Since the probability of finding a job is affected not only by individual effort but also by the aggregate state of the economy, designing unemployment insurance payments conditional on the business cycle could be valuable. This paper answers a fundamental question related to this issue: How should the payments vary with the aggregate state of the economy?

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Year of publication:	2006-04
Authors:	Sanchez, Juan M.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Unemployment Insurance \| Aggregate Fluctuations \| Recursive Contracts and Moral Hazard

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	J68 - Public Policy ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005260330