Optimal supervision intensity, collusion, and the organization of work
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Bac, Mehmet |
Published in: |
The Canadian journal of economics. - Boston, MA. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0008-4085, ZDB-ID 218117-4. - Vol. 40.2007, 1, p. 317-339
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Subject: | Arbeitsorganisation | Work organization | Hierarchie | Hierarchy | Kontrolle | Control | Korruption | Corruption | Theorie | Theory |
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