Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yildirim, Mustafa |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 177.2019, p. 81-84
|
Subject: | Legislative bargaining | Rent-seeking | Team size | Voting rule | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Abstimmungsregel | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Gesetzgebung | Legislation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
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