Optimal tenurial contracts under both moral hazard and adverse selection
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | At, Christian ; Thomas, Lionel |
Published in: |
American journal of agricultural economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 1467-8276, ZDB-ID 2026345-4. - Vol. 101.2019, 3, p. 941-959
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Subject: | Adverse selection | limited liability | moral hazard | tenurial contract | Adverse Selektion | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Limited liability | Landpacht | Land rental |
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