Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hori, Keiichi ; Osano, Hiroshi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 33.2009, 12, p. 1962-1980
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Lohn | Wages | Arbeitsmobilität | Labour mobility | Realoptionsansatz | Real options analysis | Theorie | Theory |
-
Promotion, turnover, and compensation in the executive labor market
Gayle, George-Levi, (2015)
-
Pay inequalities and managerial turnover
Kale, Jayant R., (2014)
-
Management turnover and executive compensation in synergistic takeovers
Choi, Yoon K., (2001)
- More ...
-
Managers' Investment Timing Decisions under Endogenous Compensation Contracts
Hori, Keiichi, (2011)
-
Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options
Hori, Keiichi, (2014)
-
Optimal Timing of Management Turnover in Agency Conflicts
Hori, Keiichi, (2009)
- More ...