Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Year of publication: |
2003-06-25
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Authors: | Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil |
Institutions: | Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet |
Subject: | Unemployment insurance | search | monitoring | sanctions | workfare |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in International Tax and Public Finance, 2006, pages 565-585. The text is part of a series Working Paper Series Number 2003:17 25 pages |
Classification: | J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; J68 - Public Policy |
Source: |
-
Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
-
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions
Boone, Jan, (2001)
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Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
Fredriksson, Peter, (1998)
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