Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monotoring, or workfare?
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil |
Published in: |
International tax and public finance. - New York : Springer, ISSN 0927-5940, ZDB-ID 1207421-4. - Vol. 13.2006, 5, p. 565-585
|
Subject: | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Aktivierende Arbeitsmarktpolitik | Workfare | Arbeitsuche | Job search | Anreiz | Incentives | Schweden | Sweden |
-
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
-
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare
Fredriksson, Peter, (2005)
-
Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
- More ...
-
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
-
Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Fredriksson, Peter, (2003)
-
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions
Boone, Jan, (2001)
- More ...