Optimal Use of Communication Resources

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Gossner, Olivier ; Hernández, Penélope ; Neyman, Abraham
Published in:	Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 74.2006, 6, p. 1603-1636
Publisher:	Econometric Society

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130087