Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bose, Subir ; Zhao, Jinhua |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 135.2007, 1, p. 357-381
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Signalling | Allokation | Allocation | Glücksspiel | Gambling | Theorie | Theory |
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