Ordinally bayesian incentive compatible voting rules
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Majumdar, Dipjyoti ; Sen, Arunava |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 72.2004, 2, p. 523-540
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Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory |
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