Organizational design, project selection, and incentives
by Maria de Paola and Vincenzo Scoppa
| Year of publication: |
2006
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | De Paola, Maria ; Scoppa, Vincenzo |
| Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 162.2006, 3, p. 424-449
|
| Subject: | Organisationsstruktur | Organizational structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vollkommene Information | Complete information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003403101