Organizations and the Contingent Consequences of Status Competition

People compete to be esteemed and respected in nearly all group settings. Does intragroup status competition erode the ability for groups to achieve collective aims, or is competition for status part of the very fabric upon which collective action is produced? This dissertation aims to bridge an evolutionary perspective on status competition, in which social actors compete in rivalrous contests that are generally damaging to the group, and a cultural perspective, in which status competition is governed by widely shared norms and generally encourages collective action. It advances an organizational perspective to explain the contingent consequences of status competition, whereby the consequences of status competition depend on how the competition is organized. Drawing on a variety of approaches, including quasi-experimental methods, network analysis, and participant observation, I then develop and test three specific, "middle-range" theories that demonstrate the utility of this perspective. Results from these studies challenge conventional notions of status competition as a monolithic force, suggesting how organizational forces moderate their consequences. By identifying dimensions that govern whether status competition leads to beneficial or deleterious consequences for groups, this work also offers concrete suggestions for policymakers and practitioners seeking to harness the immense power of these competitions for collective good.