Over-reaction to policy signals, and central bank optimal communication policy
Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
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Authors: | Jalali Naini, Ahmad-Reza ; Naderian, Mohammad-Amin |
Published in: |
Journal of central banking theory and practice. - Podgorica, ISSN 1800-9581, ZDB-ID 2673361-4. - Vol. 5.2016, 3, p. 165-187
|
Subject: | Optimal communication policy | imperfect common knowledge | strategic complementarity | full transparency | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication | Zentralbank | Central bank | Kommunikation | Communication | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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