Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Masiliūnas, Aidas |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 100.2019, p. 1-12
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koordination | Coordination |
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