Overcoming Participation Constraints

This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints.

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Year of publication:	2005-05
Authors:	Fang, Hanming ; Norman, Peter
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Linking \| Participation Constraints \| Groves Mechanisms \| Veto Power

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The price is None Number 1511R 51 pages
Classification:	D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593451