Overcoming Participation Constraints

This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints

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Year of publication:	[2008]
Authors:	Fang, Hanming
Other Persons:	Norman, Peter (contributor)
Publisher:	[2008]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (52 p)
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper ; No. 1511R
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2005 erstellt
Classification:	D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774203