Overcompensation as a partial solution to commitment and renegotiation problems : the case of ex post moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Boyer, Martin |
Published in: |
The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the American Risk and Insurance Association. - Malden, Mass. [u.a] : Blackwell, ISSN 0022-4367, ZDB-ID 410673-8. - Vol. 71.2004, 4, p. 559-582
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Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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