Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism
It is well known that when agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance may make all agents better off in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets. We find that when sufficiently many agents underestimate their personal risks, compulsory insurance makes low-risk agents worse off. Hence, behavioural biases may weaken some of the well-established rationales for government intervention based on asymmetric information.
Year of publication: |
2007-10-04
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Authors: | Squintani, Francesco ; Sandroni, Alvaro |
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