Overworking Public Defenders

Most U.S. criminal defendants are represented by government-employed public defenders (PDs). PDs consistently face higher caseloads than recommended by professional guidelines, but systematic evidence of the impacts of excessive workloads on defendants is lacking. This paper uses novel case-level data from three U.S. counties and an instrumental variable approach to study the causal impacts of high caseloads on PD time allocations and defendant outcomes. I exploit variation in case assignment timing, which can lead to unexpected increases in PD workloads, to instrument for workloads and find that an increase in workload does not change the probability of an acquittal/dismissal but lengthens an average sentence, conditional on conviction, significantly. Depending on the county, shifting a given PD from the 25th to the 75th percentile of their workload lengthens sentences by 93–101%. I observe PDs shifting time away from misdemeanors and low-severity felonies when caseloads increase to maintain the time they spend on high-severity felonies. I also find suggestive evidence that outcomes are worse for minority, particularly Hispanic, defendants. Taken together, my findings suggest PD overwork negatively affects the fairness of the legal system across multiple dimensions, and jurisdictions that invest in reducing PD caseloads can expect to more than offset those costs in reduced spending on incarcerations. According to my estimates, every dollar spent hiring an additional PD in Berrien County, Michigan would save $6.31 in short-term incarceration costs