Ownership and Managerial competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership
It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival firms provides adequate Incentive to perform for managers and employees. However, it is not entirely clear how ownership interacts with competition. This paper centers on the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect managers and employees' incentives to invest in human capital.
Year of publication: |
1998-06-01
|
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Authors: | Bolton, Patrick ; Xu, Chenggang |
Institutions: | William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan |
Saved in:
freely available
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