Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games

Two new evolutionary game models are presented where ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Yee, Kenton K.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	K0 - Law and Economics. General ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; K1 - Basic Areas of Law ; K2 - Regulation and Business Law ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; L0 - Industrial Organization. General ; Z1 - Cultural Economics ; E11 - Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113466