Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents
Under the reserve-clause system that assigns the property-rights on the Major League Baseball players' services to teams, player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players. In contrast, under the current free-agency system, players with free-agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors. Thus, the system assigns the property-rights to players. Using data extracted from the Baseball Archive (http://baseball1.com), this article examines the effect of the change in the property-rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams. We find that the change increased large-market teams' shares of veteran all-star players and the concentration of senior players.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Liu, Haoming ; Riyanto, Yohanes |
Published in: |
Applied Economics. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 0003-6846. - Vol. 41.2009, 26, p. 3425-3436
|
Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents
Liu, Haoming, (2009)
-
Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents
Liu, Haoming, (2009)
-
Tunneling and propping : a justification for pyramidal ownership
Riyanto, Yohanes Eko, (2008)
- More ...