Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts
This paper investigates the relationships among manager ownership, charter value, and thrift risk-taking for 1986 to 1995, a decade of significant regulatory change. We hypothesize that during periods of regulatory laxity and low charter values, manager-owned thrifts are likely to engage in unprofitable risk-taking. However, for periods of regulatory efficacy and high charter values, manager-owners are likely to engage in profitable risk-taking. In support of these premises, we find that manager-owned thrifts exhibit unprofitable risk-taking in the mid-1980s, years of regulatory laxity and low charter values, but demonstrate profitable risk-taking in the mid-1990s, a period of more stringent regulations and high charter values.
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Cebenoyan, A. Sinan ; Cooperman, Elizabeth S. ; Register, Charles A. |
Published in: |
Financial Management. - Financial Management Association - FMA. - Vol. 28.1999, 1
|
Publisher: |
Financial Management Association - FMA |
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